Abstract. This paper presents a logic-based bargaining solution based on Zhang and Zhang's framework. It is shown that if the demand sets of players are logically closed, the solution satisfies a fixed-point property, which says that the outcome of bargaining is the result of mutual belief revision. The result is interesting not only because it presents a desirable logical property of bargaining solution but also establishes a link between bargaining theory and multi-agent belief revision.
Introduction
Negotiation or bargaining is a process of dispute resolution to reach mutually beneficial agreements. The studies of negotiation in game theory, known as bargaining theory, initiated by John Nash's path-breaking work [1] , has reached a high sophistication with a variety of models and solutions and has been extensively applied to economics, sociology, management science, and politics [2, 3, 4] .
The game-theoretical model of bargaining is purely numerical. Although the numerical theory of bargaining provides "a 'clear-cut' numerical predication for a wide range of bargaining problems", it does not help us to understand how disputes are resolved through a bargaining process ( [5] p.81-88).
In recent years, the AI researchers try to rebuild the theory of bargaining and negotiation in order to model logical reasoning behind a bargaining process. Kraus et al . introduced a logical model of negotiation based on argumentation theory [6, 7] . Unlike game theory, the model allows explicit representation of negotiation items, promises, threats and arguments. More importantly, bargaining process can be embedded into logic-based multi-agent systems so that negotiation becomes a component of agent planning. Similar to Rubinstein's strategic model of bargaining, the argumentation-based approach views bargaining as a non-cooperative game. Zhang et al. introduced a logical model of negotiation based on belief revision theory [8, 9, 10] . Different from the argumentation-based framework, the belief-revision-based approach takes a cooperative view. In order to reach an agreement, each player tries to persuade the other player to accept her demands or beliefs. Anyone who is convinced to accept the other player's demands will need to conduct a course of belief revision. It was assumed that any possible outcome of negotiation, (Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 ), should satisfies the following fixedpoint condition [11] , which says that the outcome of negotiation is the common demands or beliefs after mutual belief revision:
where X i contains the demands of agent i and ⊗ i is the belief revision operator of agent i. However, there is no justification for the assumption. This paper aims to build a concrete bargaining solution to satisfy the fixed-point condition. The construction of the solution is based on the bargaining model proposed by Zhang and Zhang in [12, 13] . The result of the paper not only shows the logical property of bargaining but also establishes the link between bargaining and belief revision, which may be helpful for the investigation of multi-agent belief revision.
Logical Model of Bargaining
Within this paper, we consider the bargaining situations with two players. We assume that each party has a set of negotiation items, referred to as demand set, described by a finite propositional language L. The language is that of classical propositional logic with an associated consequence operation Cn in the sense that Cn(X) = {ϕ : X ϕ}, where X is a set of sentences. A set X of sentences is logically closed or called a belief set when X = Cn(X). If X and Y are two sets of sentences, X + Y denotes Cn(X ∪ Y ).
Suppose that X 1 and X 2 are the demand sets from two bargaining parties respectively. To simplify exploration, we use X −i to represent the other set among X 1 and X 2 if X i is one of them. If D is a vector of two components, D 1 and D 2 will represent each of the components of D.
Bargaining Games
We will use the bargaining model introduced by Zhang and Zhang in [12] to represent a bargaining situation.
Definition 1. [12]
A bargaining game is a pair ((X 1 , 1 ), (X 2 , 2 )), where X i (i = 1, 2) is a logically consistent set of sentences in L and i is a complete transitive reflexive order (total preorder or weak order) over X i which satisfies the following logical constraints 1 : We call the pair
Intuitively, a bargaining game is a formal representation of a bargaining situation whereby each player describes his demands in logical formulae and expresses his preferences over his demands in total preorder. We assume that each player has consistent demands. The preference ordering of each player reflects the degree of entrenchment in which the player defends his demands. The logical constraint (LC) says that if ϕ 1 , · · · , ϕ n and ψ are all your demands and ϕ 1 , · · · , ϕ n ψ, then ψ should not be less entrenched than all the ϕ i because if you fail to defend ψ, at least one of the ϕ i has to be dropped (otherwise you would not have lost ψ). This indicates that the preference orderings are different from players' payoff or utility. For instance, suppose that p 1 represents the demand of a seller "the price of the good is no less than $10" and p 2 denotes "the price of the good is no less than $8". Obviously the seller could get higher payoff from p 1 than p 2 . However, since p 1 implies p 2 , she will entrench p 2 no less than p 1 , i.e., p 2 p 1 , because, if she fails to keep p 1 , she can still bargain for p 2 but the loss of p 2 means the loss of both.
Given a prioritized demand set (X, ), we define recursively a hierarchy,
, of X with respect to the ordering as follows:
where ψ ϕ denotes ψ ϕ and ϕ ψ. The intuition behind the construction is that, at each stage of the construction, we collects all maximal elements from the current demand set and remove them from the set for the next stage of the construction. It is easy to see that there exists a number n such that X = n j=1 X j due to the logical constraint LC 2 . It is easy to see that for any ϕ ∈ X j and ψ ∈ X k , ϕ ψ if and only if j < k.
In the sequel, we write X ≤k to denote
Based on the hierarchy of each demand, we can define a belief revision function for each agent by following Nebel's idea of prioritized base revision [14] :
For any demand set (X, ) and a set, F , of sentences,
where X ⇓ F is defined as: H ∈ X ⇓ F if and only if
In other words, H is a maximal subset of X that is consistent with F and gives priority to the higher ranked items. The following result will be used in Section 3.
Lemma 1. [14]
If X is logically closed, then ⊗ satisfies all AGM postulates.
Possible Agreements
Similar to [12] , we define a possible outcome of negotiation as a concession made by two players.
satisfying the following conditions: for each i = 1, 2,
where
The set of all deals of G is denoted by Ω(G), called the feasible set of the game.
Intuitively, a possible agreement is a pair of subsets of two players' original demand sets such that the collection of remaining demands is consistent. Obviously each player would like to keep as many original demands as possible. Therefore, if a player has to give up a demand, the player typically gives up the ones with the lowest priority. Note that we require that no player gives up common demands, which is crucial to the fixed-point property. This is different from Zhang and Zhang's definition in [12] .
Bargaining Solution
We have shown how to generates all possible deals from a bargaining game. However, a game might have multiple deals. Different deals would be in favor of
... Instead of counting the number of demands a deal contains for each party, we consider the top block demands a player keeps in the deal (the top levels of demands in each player's demand hierarchy) and ignore all demands that are not included in the top blocks except the common demands 3 . Given a deal D, we shall use the maximal top levels of each player's demands the deal contains as the indicator of the player's gain from the deal, i.e., max{k : Figure 2 , player 1 can successfully remain maximally top k + 1 levels of his demands from deal D while player 2 gains maximally top k levels of his demands from the deal.
To compare players' gains from different deals, we use the gain of the player with smaller gain from a deal as the index of the deal, i.e., min{max{k : Figure 2 , the gain index of D is k while the gain index of D is k − 1. By using this index, we can collect all the best deals of a game:
Based on the intuitive description, we are now ready to construct our bargaining solution.
Definition 3. A bargaining solution is a function F which maps a bargaining game
) to a pair of sets of sentences defined as follows:
where γ(G) = arg max
3 Note that common demands of two parties are always included in a deal no matter how much priorities they have.
and
We call Φ = (Φ 1 , Φ 2 ) the core of the game. Intuitively, the core of the game is the pair of maximal top block demands that are contained in all the best deals.
To help the reader to understand our solution, let us consider the following example. In order to represent the situation in logic, let c denote "buy a new car", d stand for "domestic holiday", o for "overseas holiday", k for "kitchen redecoration" and l for "loan". Then ¬(d ∧ o) means that it is impossible to have both domestic holiday and overseas holiday. The statement (c ∧ o) → l says that if they want to buy a new car and also have an overseas holiday, they have to get a loan from the bank.
With the above symbolization, we can express the husband's demands in the following set:
Similarly, the wife's demands can be represented by:
Assume that the husband's preferences over his demands are:
and the wife's preferences are:
Let G represent the bargaining game. It is easy to calculate that the game has the following three possible deals:
. The core of the game is then:
γ(G) contains only a single deal, which is D 2 . The solution is then
In words, the couple agree upon the commonsense that they can only have one holiday and they have to get a loan if they want to buy a new car and to go overseas for holiday. The husband accepts his wife's suggestion to have holiday in Europe and the wife agrees on buying a new car. As a consequence of the agreement, they agree on getting a loan to buy the car.
Fixed Point Property
In [11] , it was argued that a procedure of negotiation can be viewed as a course of mutual belief revision when players' belief states with respect to the negotiation are specified by the demand sets of the bargaining game. Before we show the fixed-point property of the solution we construct, let us consider two facts on the solution:
Lemma 3. Given a bargaining game G, for any deal
where (Φ 1 , Φ 2 ) is the core of G.
Proof. "⇒" Straightforward from the definition of γ(G).
"
The above results show an intuitive procedure to construct a bargaining solution. First calculate the core by going through both parties's hierarchies of demands in parallel top-down to the level at which the collective demands are maximally consistent with the common demands. Then collect all the deals that contain the core. Finally, calculate the intersection of the deals that contain the core for each party.
Assume that X 1 and X 2 are two belief sets (so logically closed), representing the belief states of two agents. Mutual belief revision between the agents means that each agent takes part of the other agent's beliefs to revise his belief set. For instance, if Ψ 1 is a subset of X 1 and Ψ 2 is a subset of X 2 , then X 1 ⊗ 1 Ψ 2 is the revised belief set of player 1 after he accepts player 2's beliefs Ψ 2 while X 2 ⊗ 2 Ψ 1 is the resulting belief set of player 2 after accepting Ψ 1 . Such an interaction of belief revision can continue until it reaches a fixed point where the beliefs in common,
, are exactly the beliefs that the agents mutually accept, Ψ 1 + Ψ 2 . This gives
Suppose that the belief sets, X 1 and X 2 , represent the two agents' demands, respectively. Then (
should represent the common revised demands after negotiation if Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 are the agreements that are mutually accepted each other. Therefore any bargaining solution should satisfy the fixed-point condition (4). The following theorem confirms that the solution we constructed in this paper satisfies the fixed-point condition.
Theorem 1. For any bargaining game
, if X 1 and X 2 are logically closed, the bargaining solution F (G) satisfies the following fixedpoint condition:
where ⊗ i is the prioritized revision operator for player i.
To show this theorem, we need a few technical lemmas.
Lemma 4. For any bargaining game
Proof. According to the definition of prioritized base revision, we have
This is because we can extend the pair (H,
On the other hand, since
The proof of the second statement is similar.
By this lemma we have,
Note that the above lemma does not require the demand sets X 1 and X 2 to be logically closed. However, the following lemmas do.
and X 2 are logically closed, then
Proof. We only present the proof of the first statement. The second one is similar. Firstly, we prove that
is consistent, the result is obviously true. Therefore we can assume that
is inconsistent. Since our language is finite and both X 1 and X 2 are logically closed, the sets
are all logically closed (the latter two due to LC). Therefore each set has a finite axiomatization. Let
and ψ 2 axiomatize
Now we prove that
. According to the AGM postulates, we have (
In addition, it is easy to prove that Φ 1 ⊆ X 1 ⊗ 1 (Φ 2 + (X 1 ∩ X 2 )). By the AGM postulates again, we have
The following lemma will complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 6.
If X 1 and X 2 are logically closed, then
, where π
, where π Φ 2 ) is the core of G. Note that in the cases when π i max does not exist, we simply assume that it equals to +∞. We claim that
We shall provide the proof of the first statement. The second one is similar.
Firstly, according to Lemma 2, Φ 1 ⊆ Φ 1 . Secondly, by Lemma 5, we have
By the construction of prioritized revision, we can easily verify that X 2 ) ). Therefore we only have to show the other direction, i.e.,
) and H is logically closed, we have ψ ∈ H, which contradicts the consistency of
Finally we prove the claim of the lemma.
Conclusion and Related Work
We have presented a logic-based bargaining solution based on Zhang and Zhang's model [12] . We have shown that the solution satisfies the fixed-point property, which asserts that the procedure of negotiation can be viewed as a course of mutual belief revision. The result is interesting not only because the result itself presents a desirable logical property of bargaining solutions but also establishes a link between bargaining and multi-agent belief revision. On the one hand, efforts have been made to the investigation of multi-agent belief revision [15, 16] , the research is far from satisfaction. On the other hand, bargaining have been a research topic in game theory for a few decades with sophisticated theory and variety of applications. It is easy to see that all the concepts introduced in this paper for the two-player bargaining game can be easily extended to the n-player cases. However, the extension of fixed-point property of mutual belief revision can be extremely hard. Therefore the link between bargaining and belief revision could give us a better understanding of multi-agent belief revision and could give us some hints towards the research.
The fixed-point property for negotiation functions was proposed by Zhang et al. [11] . However, there was no concrete negotiation function is constructed to satisfy the property. Meyer et al. gave a construction of negotiation function based on belief revision and discussed their logical properties [9, 10] . Zhang and Zhang presented another belief-revision-based bargaining solution [12, 13] , which is similar to ours. However it is not too hard to verify that none of the above mentioned solutions satisfies the fixed-point property. Jin et al. [17] presents a mutual belief revision function that satisfies a fixed-point condition. However, the construction of the function is defined on belief revision operator and the fixed-point condition describes totally different property, which says that mutual belief revision is closed under iteration.
